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Abstract
Conventional federated learning directly averaging model
weights is only possible if all local models have the same
model structure. Naturally, it poses a restrictive constraint
for collaboration between models with heterogeneous archi-
tectures. Sharing prediction instead of weight removes this
obstacle and eliminates the risk of white-box inference attacks
in conventional federated learning. However, the predictions
from local models are sensitive and would leak private informa-
tion to the public. Currently, there is no theoretic guarantee that
sharing prediction is private and secure. To address this issue,
one naive approach is adding the differentially private random
noise to the predictions like previous privacy works related
to federated learning. Although the privacy concern is miti-
gated with random noise perturbation, it brings a new problem
with a substantial trade-off between privacy budget and model
performance. In this paper, we fill in this gap by proposing a
novel framework called FEDMD-NFDP, which applies the
new proposed Noise-Free Differential Privacy (NFDP) mech-
anism into a federated model distillation framework. NFDP
can effectively protect the privacy of local data with the least
sacrifice of the model utility. Our extensive experimental re-
sults on various datasets validate that FEDMD-NFDP can
deliver not only comparable utility, communication efficiency
but also provide a noise-free differential privacy guarantee.
We also demonstrate the feasibility of our FEDMD-NFDP
by considering both IID and non-IID setting, heterogeneous
model architectures, and unlabelled public datasets from a
different distribution.
Introduction
Federated learning (FL) provides a privacy-aware paradigm
of model training, which allows a multitude of parties to
construct a joint machine learning (ML) model without di-
rectly exposing their private training data (McMahan et al.
2017; Bonawitz et al. 2017). Nevertheless, recent works have
demonstrated that FL may not always provide sufficient pri-
vacy guarantees, as communicating model updates through-
out the training process can nonetheless reveal sensitive in-
formation (Bhowmick et al. 2018; Melis et al. 2019) even
incur deep leakage (Zhu, Liu, and Han 2019).
In order to protect training data privacy in FL, various
privacy protection techniques have been proposed in the liter-
ature (Shokri and Shmatikov 2015; Geyer, Klein, and Nabi
∗Equal contribution. Order determined by coin toss.
2017; McMahan et al. 2018; Bonawitz et al. 2017; Nguyên
et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2019; Zhao et al. 2020; Lyu et al.
2020; Truex et al. 2019; Sun et al. 2020). From the per-
spective of differential privacy, most works focus on the
centralized differential privacy (CDP) that requires a central
trusted party to add noise to the aggregated gradients (Geyer,
Klein, and Nabi 2017; McMahan et al. 2018). Moreover,
these works are geared to tackle thousands of users for train-
ing to converge and achieve an acceptable trade-off between
privacy and accuracy (McMahan et al. 2018), resulting in a
convergence problem with a small number of parties (Lyu,
Yu, and Yang 2020).
To achieve stronger privacy protection than CDP, a few re-
cent works start to integrate local differential privacy (LDP)
into the federated learning (Shokri and Shmatikov 2015).
Shokri et al. (Shokri and Shmatikov 2015) firstly attempted
to apply DP to distributed/federated learning, in which each
party individually adds noise to its model updates before re-
leasing to the server, ensuring local DP. However, the differen-
tial privacy bound is given per-weight, and a large number of
weights prevents the technique from providing a meaningful
privacy guarantee (Papernot et al. 2017).
Some approaches that also considered LDP into FL can
only support shallow models such as logistic regression
and only focus on simple tasks and datasets (Nguyên et al.
2016; Wang et al. 2019; Zhao et al. 2020). Bhowmick et al.
(Bhowmick et al. 2018) presented a viable approach to large-
scale local private model training. Due to the high variance of
their mechanism, it requires more than 200 communication
rounds and incurs much higher privacy cost, i.e., MNIST
( = 500) and CIFAR-10 ( = 5000). A recent work (Truex
et al. 2020) utilized Condensed Local Differential Privacy (α-
CLDP) into federated learning. However, α-CLDP achieved
that performance by requiring a relatively privacy budget
 = α · 2c · 10p (e.g. α = 1, c = 1, p = 10), which results
in a weak privacy guarantee. Another contemporary work
called LDP-FL (Sun et al. 2020) achieves better performance
on both effectiveness and efficiency than (Truex et al. 2020)
with the special communication design for deep learning
approaches.
However, these works considered privacy issues in con-
ventional FL that requires parties to share model weights.
Compared with sharing prediction via knowledge transfer,
conventional FL system (McMahan et al. 2017, 2018) suf-
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fers from several intrinsic limitations: (1) it requires every
party to share their local model weights in each round, thus
limiting only to models with homogeneous architectures; (2)
sharing model weight incurs a significant privacy issue of
local model, as it opens all the internal state of the model to
white-box inference attacks; (3) model weight is usually of
much higher dimension than model predictions, resulting in
huge communication overhead and higher privacy cost.
Inspired by the knowledge transfer algorithms (Buciluaˇ,
Caruana, and Niculescu-Mizil 2006; Hinton, Vinyals, and
Dean 2015), Federated Model Distillation (FedMD) shares
the knowledge of FL parties’ models via their predictions on
an unlabeled public set (Li and Wang 2019). However, shar-
ing prediction will still leak the privacy of the local data (Lyu,
Law, and Ng 2019). Currently, there is no reasonable privacy
guarantee for sharing model prediction in FL. A naive ap-
proach is similar to previous works mentioned above: we can
add the differentially private random noise perturbation into
the predictions of local models. However, prior works have
shown the significant trade-off between privacy budget and
model performance. As such, we are motivated to fill in this
gap. To our best knowledge, this is the first work that provides
a theoretical noise-free differential privacy (NFDP) mecha-
nism that guarantees the privacy protection for each party in
the federated model distillation, named FEDMD-NFDP.
Our main contribution is multifold. First, we propose
FEDMD-NFDP a novel federated model distillation frame-
work with the new proposed noise-free differential privacy
(NFDP) mechanism that guarantees each party’s privacy pro-
tection. Second, We formally prove that NFDP with both
replacement and without replacement sampling strategies
can inherently ensure (, δ)-differential privacy, eliminating
noise addition and privacy cost explosion issues explicitly in
previous works. Last, Our FEDMD-NFDP allows flexible
aggregation over heterogeneous local models that can dif-
fer, e.g., in model structure, size, etc. Extensive experiments
on benchmark datasets, various settings (IID and non-IID
data distribution), and heterogeneous model architectures,
demonstrate that our FEDMD-NFDP achieves comparable
utility by using only a few private samples that are randomly
sampled from each party, validating the numerous benefits of
our framework.
Preliminary and Related Work
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) has become a de facto standard for
privacy analysis. DP can either be enforced in a “local" or
“global" sense depending on whether the server is trusted. For
FL scenarios where data are sourced from multiple parties,
while the server is untrusted, DP should be enforced in a
“local" manner to enable parties to perturb their data before
publication, which we term as LDP. Compared with global
model via DP (CDP) (Dwork and Roth 2014; Abadi et al.
2016), LDP offers a stronger level of protection.
Definition 1. A randomized mechanismM: D → R with
domain D and rangeR satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy if
for all two neighbouring inputs D,D′ ∈ D and any measur-
able subset of outputs S ⊆ R it holds that
Pr{M(D) ∈ S} ≤ exp() · Pr{M(D′) ∈ S}+ δ .
FurthermoreM is said to preserve (pure) -differential pri-
vacy if δ = 0.
A formal definition of record-level DP is provided in Defi-
nition 1, which bounds the effect of the presence or the ab-
sence of a record on the output likelihood within a small fac-
tor . The additive term δ allows that the unlikely responses
do not need to satisfy the pure -DP criterion. One common
practice to realize (, δ)-DP is Gaussian mechanism (Dwork
and Roth 2014).
Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a promising collabo-
ration paradigm by enabling a multitude of parties to jointly
construct a global model without exposing their private train-
ing data. In FL, parties do not need to explicitly share their
training data, they have full autonomy for their local data.
FL generally comes in two forms(McMahan et al. 2017):
FedSGD, in which each client sends every SGD update to the
server, and FedAVG, in which clients locally batch multiple
iterations of SGD before sending updates to the server, which
is more communication efficient. To enhance the privacy
protection, differential privacy has been recently applied to
federated learning (Bhowmick et al. 2018; Geyer, Klein, and
Nabi 2017; McMahan et al. 2018). Previous works mostly
focus on either the centralized differential privacy mecha-
nism that requires a central trusted party (Geyer, Klein, and
Nabi 2017; McMahan et al. 2018), or local differential pri-
vacy (LDP), in which each user randomizes its gradients
locally before sending it to an untrusted aggregator (Truex
et al. 2019; Sun et al. 2020).
Knowledge Distillation
Knowledge distillation (Buciluaˇ, Caruana, and Niculescu-
Mizil 2006; Hinton, Vinyals, and Dean 2015) is originally
designed to extract class probability produced by a large
DNN or an ensemble of DNNs to train a smaller DNN with
marginal utility loss. It also offers a powerful tool to share
knowledge of a model through its predictions. Knowledge of
ensemble of teacher models has been used to train a student
model in previous works (Hamm, Cao, and Belkin 2016;
Papernot et al. 2017). Papernot el. al. (Papernot et al. 2017)
proposed PATE, a centralized learning approach that uses
ensemble of teachers to label a subset of unlabeled public data
in a differentially private manner, then trains a student in a
semi-supervised fashion (Dwork and Roth 2014). We remark
that our focus is fundamentally different from the setting of
PATE, which requires a trusted aggregator to aggregate the
prediction label made by the teacher ensemble and conduct
DP mechanisms.
More recently, FedMD (Li and Wang 2019) and
Cronus (Chang et al. 2019) attempted to apply knowledge dis-
tillation to FL by considering knowledge transfer via model
distillation, in which, the logits on an unlabeled public dataset
from parties’ models are averaged. In FedMD, each model is
first trained on the public data to align with public logits, then
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on its own private data. In contrast, Cronus mixes the public
dataset (with soft labels) and local private data, then trains
local models simultaneously. One obvious benefit of sharing
logits is the reduced communication costs, without signifi-
cantly sacrificing utility. However, both works did not offer
theoretical privacy guarantee for sharing model prediction.
Federated Model Distillation with Noise-Free
Differential Privacy
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Figure 1: Overview of the naive FEDMD-LDP and our
FEDMD-NFDP in each communication round. Each party
first updates its model wi to approach the consensus on the
public dataset (Digest); then updates its model wi on its own
sampled subset from private local data (Revisit). Note that
the sampled subset (Xi, Yi) ∈ Di is fixed in all rounds.
Figure 1 shows an overview of FEDMD-LDP and our
FEDMD-NFDP. Unlike the existing federated learning al-
gorithms, such as FedAvg, FedMD does not force a single
global model onto local models. Instead, each local model
is updated separately. To support heterogeneous model ar-
chitectures, we assume that an unlabeled public dataset is
available, then parties share the knowledge that they have
learned from their training data (their model predictions) in a
succinct, black-box and model agnostic manner.
It should be noted that FEDMD-LDP requires each party
to explicitly inject noise to ensure DP individually before
releasing their local model knowledge to the server. The
privacy cost will accumulate as per the dimension of the
shared knowledge (|Yp| ∗ class), as well as the communica-
tion rounds, resulting in huge privacy cost. Here |Yp| is the
number of the chosen public set and class refers to the class
number. In contrast, our FEDMD-NFDP inherently ensures
that the released local model knowledge by each party is
Algorithm 1 FEDMD-NFDP. Initialization phase does not
involve collaboration. Di and wi are local dataset and model
parameters from i-th party. Y ip are predictions from i-th party
on the chosen public subset Xp ∈ Dp in round t.
1: Initialization phase
2: Initializes each party i ∈ [N ] with the same pretrained
model, randomly samples subset (Xi, Yi) ∈ Di, and
updates their weights in parallel:
3: for t ∈ [T1] epochs do
4: Update wi ← TRAIN (wi, Xi, Yi)
5: end for
6: Y ip [0] = PREDICT(wi;Xp)
7: Send Y ip [0] to the server
8: Collaboration phase
9: Yp[0] = fAggreg({Y i∈[N ]p [0]})
10: for t ∈ [R] communication rounds do
11: Server randomly samples a public subset Xp ∈ Dp
12: for i ∈ [N ] parties do
13: for t ∈ [T2] epochs do
14: Digest: wi ← TRAIN (wi, Xp, Yp[t])
15: end for
16: for t ∈ [T3] epochs do
17: Revisit: wi ← TRAIN (wi, Xi, Yi)
18: end for
19: Y ip [t] = PREDICT(wi;Xp)
20: Send Y ip [t] to the server
21: end for
22: Yp[t+ 1] = fAggreg({Y i∈[N ]p [t]})
23: end for
differentially private via data sampling process, as indicated
in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Algorithm 1 describes our FEDMD-NFDP algorithm,
which consists of two training phases: (1) during initialization
phase, every party i updates its local model weights wi on a
randomly sampled subset (Xi, Yi) ∈ Di from local private
training data Di for T1 times without any collaboration; (2)
during collaboration phase, parties share the knowledge of
their local models via their predictions on a subset of pub-
lic data, Xp. In each round of the collaboration phase, the
detailed procedure includes:
• Each party uses its local model weights wi to compute
prediction vectors Y ip for Xp and shares them with the
server.
• The server aggregates the predictions (separately for each
public record), i.e., computes Yp = fAggreg(Y 1p , · · · , Y Np ),
and sends Yp to all parties for the next round’s local train-
ing; fAggreg is an aggregation algorithm, which is average
function throughout this work.
• Each party updates its local model weightswi by first train-
ing on the soft-labeled public data (Xp, Yp) to approach
the consensus on the public dataset (Digest); then training
on its previously sampled local subset (Revisit).
In additionan, the Algorithm 1 can also support the im-
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(a) (b)
Figure 2:  and δ comparison between without (i.e., w/o)
replacement and with (i.e., w) replacement. Note that, n =
100, k is the size of the sampled subset.
plementation of FEDMD-LDP. The only difference is the
output in line 14 should be perturbed by the differentirally
private random noise, which can be randomly sampled from
either Laplace or Gaussian distribution.
Theoretical Analysis
In this work, we consider record-level DP for each party.
NFDP with random sampling from each party’s training
dataset has the following differential privacy guarantee. The
nice property of NFDP with random sampling once and the
post-processing property of differential privacy (Dwork and
Roth 2014) removes the privacy dependence on the number
of queries on the public dataset. Random sampling without
replacement and with replacement are two most common
sampling strategies, and we prove the (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy for both of them below.
Theorem 1. [NFDP mechanism: (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy of sampling without replacement] Given a training
dataset of size n, sampling without replacement achieves
(ln n+1n+1−k ,
k
n )-differential privacy, where k is the subsample
size.
Theorem 2. [NFDP mechanism: (, δ)-differential privacy
of sampling with replacement] Given a training dataset of
size n, sampling with replacement achieves ((k ln n+1n , 1−(
n−1
n
)k
)-differential privacy, where k is the subsample size.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 1 using sampling with replacement
is consistently more private than using sampling without
replacement for any n > 0 and 0 < k ≤ n.
Proof. Due to the limited space, please check all related
proofs of lemma and theorems in Appendix.
Experimental Evaluation
Experimental Settings
In the experiment, we evaluate our experiments on paired
datasets, i.e., MNIST/FEDMNIST and CIFAR10/CIFAR100.
For MNIST/FEMNIST, the public data is the MNIST, and
the private data is a subset of the Federated Extended MNIST
(FEMNIST) (Caldas et al. 2018), which is built by partition-
ing the data in Extended MNIST based on the writer of the
Table 1: Summary of datasets
Task Public Private
IID MNIST FEMNIST letters [a-f] classes
IID CIFAR10 CIFAR100 subclasses [0,2,20,63,71,82]
Non-IID MNIST FEMNIST letters from one writers
Non-IID CIFAR10 CIFAR100 superclasses [0-5]
digit/character. In the IID scenario, the private dataset of each
party is drawn randomly from FEMNIST. In the non-IID
scenario, each party only has letters written by a single writer,
and the task is to classify letters by all writers.
For CIFAR10/CIFAR100, the public dataset is the CI-
FAR10, and the private dataset is a subset of the CI-
FAR100 (Krizhevsky, Hinton et al. 2009), which has 100
subclasses that fall under 20 superclasses, e.g., bear, leopard,
lion, tiger, and wolf belongs to large carnivores (Li and Wang
2019). In the IID scenario, each party is required to classify
test images into correct subclasses. The non-IID scenario
is more challenging: each party has data from one subclass
per superclass but needs to classify generic test data into the
correct superclasses. Therefore, it necessitates knowledge
sharing among parties.
Each party’s local model is two or three-layer deep
neural networks for both MNIST/FEMNIST and CI-
FAR10/CIFAR100. All experiments are implemented by us-
ing Pytorch. A single GPU NVIDIA Tesla V100 is used in
the experiments. FEMNSIT and CIFAR can be done within
an hour at N = 10 parties. A summary of the public and
private datasets used in this paper is provided in Table 1.
In each communication round, we use a subset of size
5000 that is randomly selected from the entire public dataset.
We empirically validate FEDMD-NFDP largely reduces
the communication cost without degrading the utility. The
number of training epochs in Algorithm 1 and the batch
size in the Digest and the Revisit phase may impact the
stability of the learning process. We empirically choose
R = 20, T1 = 20, T2 = 2, T3 = 1 via grid search. We
initialize all parties with the same pre-trained model on some
labelled data in the same domain. For example, parties train-
ing on the private FEMNIST are initialized with the same
pre-trained model on some labelled MNIST data.
Baselines
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed FEDMD-
NFDP by comparison with the following three frameworks.
We omit the comparison with FedAvg as it delivers similar
utility as the Centralized framework.
1. Non-private Federated Model Distillation (FedMD-NP)
framework: All parties train on all their local private data,
collaborate the public data distillation, and use the aggre-
gation feedbacks to update the local model as same as
FedMD. It should be noted that there is no privacy guaran-
tee in this framework.
2. Centralized framework: if the private data of all parties
were pooled into a centralized server and made directly
available to all the parties. We use this as the utility upper
bound of FedMD-NP and our FEDMD-NFDP.
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(a)  = k ln n/N+1
n/N (b) δ = 1−
(
n/N−1
n/N
)k
(c) σ = c2
√
T log(1/δ)

Figure 3: Log 10 scale of , δ for each party in FEDMD-NFDP/FEDMD-LDP v.s. the number of parities N . Note that, we use
fixed k = 3. Here T is the total number of queries and we have T = 100000 in 20 round communications, i.e., 5000 queries on
the public dataset in each round. n is the size of private datasets owned by all parties, which is 28800 for FEMNIST and 3000 for
CIFAR. The log 10 scale of δ of FEDMD-LDP is calculated by  and δ, which are from (a) and (b) by the corresponding N .
(a) FEMNIST (b) CIFAR
Figure 4: Accuracy v.s. Communication Round
3. FEDMD-LDP framework: FEDMD-LDP requires each
party to explicitly add Gaussian noise to locally ensure
(, δ)-DP before releasing their local model knowledge to
the server.
Performance Analysis
Evaluation on privacy budget . It can be observed from
Figure. 3(a) that FEDMD-NFDP can ensure strong privacy
protection during training and communication. For each party
of FEDMD-NFDP we fixed k = 3, which means we only
randomly sample three private data points from each private
local dataset. While more parties participate in the training
and communication, the number of each private local dataset
becomes smaller, since each party’s data size equals the total
number of private data n divides the number of parties N .
Due to that, although we fixed the random sample size k,
while we increase the number of the parties, the privacy
budget  will increase. However, as you can see, the  is very
small, its log 10 scale is close to -2 for CIFAR and -3 for
FEMNIST, while the number of parties N is 10.
Evaluation on δ. Similar to , δ is defined based on The-
orem 2. Figure. 3(b) shows that the increasing number of
parties will increase the δ. The δ is small, its log 10 scale is
close to -2 for CIFAR and -3 for FEMNIST, while the number
of parties N is 10. Note that, in real life, the private data are
collected by each party independently, so more parties would
not decrease the local data size in practice.
Evaluation on σ in FEDMD-LDP. Besides our proposed
approach, the most naive solution is FEDMD-LDP. Unlike
FEDMD-NFDP, Fed-LDP can use all the private dataset for
training and only protect the distillation information on the
public dataset, as shown in Figure 1(a). However, FedMD is
cursed by a massive number of queries and multi-round com-
munications ad per the sequential composition in DP (Dwork
and Roth 2014). While giving the same , δ as FEDMD-
NFDP, the σ is a huge number from 4 to 7 in the log 10 scale.
The σ controls the variance of the random noise, and a very
large σ will break down the utility of the original informa-
tion. In this case, we do not report the experiment results of
FEDMD-LDP in this work, since the prediction results are
close to random guess with a huge noise scale of σ for both
FEMNIST and CIFAR. The only way is to set a very large
 and δ for FEDMD-LDP, but it will no longer protect the
privacy of the local data well.
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Evaluation on model convergence. Figure. 4 presents the
accuracy trajectories of each party in our FEDMD-NFDP.
As shown in Figure 4, all parties can converge to a decent
performance within 20 communication rounds, largely reduc-
ing communication cost. Due to the complexity of the tasks,
FEMNIST shows a slightly better performance than CIFAR.
Evaluation on distillation approaches. In the original
FedMD paper, they uses logits as the distillation approach.
However, in our implementation, besides the logits, we also
build the distillation with softmax and argmax approaches.
Softmax approach returns the soft labels and argmax ap-
proach returns the hard label for each query. From Table 3,
we can see that the results did not differ too much between
different approaches in general. However, we think argmax
label approach is the most suitable one in FedMD and our sys-
tem. There are two main reasons: (1) argmax shows slightly
better performance than the other two approaches; (2) more
importantly, argmax can save much communication cost of
each query. Both softmax and logits need to send the float
vectors, but argmax only needs to send the integer during
communication. In this case, we recommend using argmax
distillation approach in FEDMD-NFDP.
Evaluation on IID and Non-IID distributions. Table 4
shows the evaluation on Non-IID dataset through FEDMD-
NFDP can achieve a superior performance with a low privacy
cost because of the noise-free differential privacy mechanism.
Compared with IID, non-IID is definitely more challenging
due to the incomplete data information of each class. The
detailed setting of experiment are well introduced in the
appendix. From the results, we can see that FEMNIST can do
better on Non-IID tasks. The main reason is for CIFAR task,
we only use one sub-class during training which hardly train
the local model well for other classification. For example,
one party has the wolfs dataset during training, but it is hardly
to help classify lions correctly as large carnivores.
Evaluation on number of parities. It is not hard to see
that more parties improve the utility in the federated learn-
ing. Figure 5 shows that more collaboration can effectively
improve the performance of each local model. Although we
only have ten parties in total, but it already can achieve a
good performance on complex image dataset, i.e. CIFAR.
Compared with FEDMD-NFDP, previous private collabo-
rate learning framework requires at least hundreds parties to
be robust to the noise perturbation from previous DP and LDP
mechanisms (Papernot et al. 2017; Geyer, Klein, and Nabi
2017; Bhowmick et al. 2018; Sun et al. 2020). In this case,
FEDMD-NFDP also is the work firstly provides a private
collaboration system with a small number of the parties.
Comparison with baselines. Table 2 shows that FEDMD-
NFDP can achieve a superior performance with a low privacy
cost because of the noise-free differential privacy mechanism.
For all methods, the reported the average accuracy of the ten
parities. When we increase the privacy budget, it can even
outperform the FEDMD-NFDP approach and be comparable
to the Centralized approach. Meanwhile, as we can see, with
a very small (,δ) with k = 16, we still can achieve a compet-
itive performance on CIFAR. In most previous works related
Figure 5: Accuracy v.s. Number of Parities
to differential privacy in federated learning (Geyer, Klein,
and Nabi 2017; Bhowmick et al. 2018; Sun et al. 2020), none
of them can achieve comparable performance on CIFAR with
a small  like us.
Note that, we did not list the utility of the FEDMD-LDP,
since the utility of each model is close to random guess while
we use the same privacy budget as FEDMD-NFDP. Put in
another way, FEDMD-LDP requires an extremely large noise
scale to ensure the same level of (, δ)-DP as FEDMD-NFDP,
resulting in poor utility. However, it no longer becomes a
problem in FEDMD-NFDP. After the random sampling with
replacement approach in the first step, FEDMD-NFDP is
already ((k ln n+1n , 1−
(
n−1
n
)k
)-differential privacy due to
the post-processing property (Dwork and Roth 2014). The
significant trade-off between privacy budget and model per-
formance is frequently seen in previous differentially private
federated learning works.
Comparison with previous works. Many conventional
federated leaning works with both CDP and LDP are in pub-
lic. Our results are competitive comparing to these previous
works. Currently, most of the popular differential privacy
approaches, such as DP-SGD (Abadi et al. 2016), PATE (Pa-
pernot et al. 2017), are cursed by the number of queries and
communication rounds when they are applied to FL. Since
each query touches the private information, it will leak the
privacy information anyway even after noise perturbation.
The large number of queries becomes a more severe problem
in FL with multi-round communications.
Geyer et al. (Geyer, Klein, and Nabi 2017) first apply cen-
tral DP on federated learning. While they use 100 clients,
they can only achieve 78% on MNIST within 20 rounds with
 = 8. One of the most recent work (Bhowmick et al. 2018)
first utilize the LDP in federated learning. However, as same
as what we claimed before, it is similar to FEDMD-LDP
that requires a huge privacy budget for the training. Due
to the different mechanism and system design, their system
requires more than 200 communication rounds and spends
much more privacy budgets, i.e., MNIST ( = 500) and
CIFAR10 ( = 5000). Sun et al. (Sun et al. 2020) is the
most recent LDP federated learning works. They can achieve
96.24% accuracy with  = 1 and 100 clients, 86.26% ac-
curacy with  = 4 and 100 clients, and 61.46% accuracy
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Table 2: Comparisons with All Baselines
FEMNIST k  δ Accuracy CIFAR k  δ Accuracy
FEDMD-NP 2880 +∞ 1 96.15% FedMD-NP 300 +∞ 1 86.88%
Centralized 2880 +∞ 1 98.00% Centralized 300 +∞ 1 88.83%
FEDMD-NFDP 16 0.0027 0.0062 80.64% FEDMD-NFDP 16 0.0260 0.0583 74.40%
FEDMD-NFDP 60 0.0090 0.0206 88.06% FEDMD-NFDP 60 0.0867 0.1815 81.58%
FEDMD-NFDP 300 0.0452 0.0989 93.56% FEDMD-NFDP 120 0.1734 0.3301 83.57%
FEDMD-NFDP 2880 0.4342 0.6321 96.63% FEDMD-NFDP 300 0.4336 0.6327 87.38%
Table 3: Different Distillation Approaches
N logits softmax argmax
FEDMD-NFDP
FEMNIST 5 74.99% 75.02% 75.58%10 80.74% 80.64% 81.58%
CIFAR 5 69.79% 70.02% 70.01%10 74.55% 74.88% 75.12%
with  = 10 and 500 clients on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST
and CIFAR10, respectively. In order to achieve a small pri-
vacy budget cost, they choose to use shuffling and splitting
mechanism. However, their new designed mechanism needs
special communication and hardware supports, which will
incur extra communication cost in real application. Over-
all, FEDMD-NFDP achieves better performance on both
effectiveness and efficiency among relevant works.
Discussion
Diversity of public dataset. In federated model distilla-
tion, the public dataset requires careful deliberation and even
prior knowledge on parties’ private datasets. The distribu-
tion of the unlabeled public dataset could either match, or
differ from the distribution of the training data available at
the parties to some degree. It remains to know how the gap
widens when the public dataset becomes more different from
the training dataset, the worst case could be from different
domains without any overlap. There is also a potential to use
the synthetic data from a pre-trained generator (e.g. GAN)
as public data to alleviate potential limitations (e.g. acqui-
sition, storage) of real unlabeled datasets. This may open
up numerous possibilities for effective and efficient model
distillation.
Diversity of local models. FEDMD-NFDP allows local
models in FL to not only differ in model structure, size, but
also numerical precision, offering great benefit for the Inter-
net of Things (IoT) that involves edge devices with diverse
hardware configurations and computing resources.
Weighted aggregation. The aggregation step in Algo-
rithm 1 is based on directly averaging of parties’ predictions,
i.e., fAggreg corresponds to the average function with equal
weight 1/N , where N is the number of parties. However,
parties may contribute to the consensus differently, especially
in the extreme cases of model and data heterogeneity. Allo-
cating all the parties with the same weight may negatively
impact system utility. We remark that there are various ag-
gregation algorithms to conduct more advanced weighted
average that can further boost utility. These weights can be
used to quantify the contributions from local models, and play
Table 4: IID vs Non-IID
N IID Non-IID
FEDMD-NFDP FEMNIST 10 81.58% 78.36%CIFAR 10 75.12% 53.18%
important roles in dealing with extremely different models.
Limitations. Based on the privacy analysis of NFDP mech-
anisms, for both with replacement or without replacement
sampling strategies, we require each local party has an ade-
quate size of the dataset. For example, if each local data only
has one label, our mechanism can not protect any privacy due
to the private training data’s size limitation.
In this case, NFDP could be very useful for three scenarios.
First, one party is required to provide machine learning as
a service (MLaaS) for others, i.e., teacher-student learning
framework. While this party contains a large size of private
data, NFDP could help it to train a private guaranteed model.
Second, one party has a large dataset, but the data itself is lack
of diversity. The model still can not achieve a good perfor-
mance due to the data diversity limitation. In this case, they
need to communicate with others for a better model utility,
and we can use NFDP to protect them during their commu-
nications. Finally, some learning tasks only require a small
fraction of the private training data involving, such as FedMD
(Vinyals et al. 2016; Snell, Swersky, and Zemel 2017). NFDP
can perform well on these tasks with adequate privacy pro-
tection. Besides FedMD, traditional one-shot learning and
few-short learning tasks are also suitable to use NFDP for
privacy protection in the same reason.
Note that, due to the property of the NFDP, it can mostly
leverage the benefits from the public dataset without any
additional privacy penalty during the model training or com-
munication. That’s the one of the most important reasons
we think FEDMD-NFDP provides a real practical solution
among all existing private federated learning approaches.
Conclusion
In this work, we formulated a new federated model distilla-
tion framework with noise-free differential privacy guarantee
for each party. We formally prove that NFDP both with re-
placement and without replacement sampling can inherently
ensure (, δ)-differential privacy, eliminating explicitly noise
addition and privacy cost explosion issues in the previous
works. We will discuss the strengths and limitations of the
NFDP, and the most appropriate scenarios can directly ap-
ply our new proposed mechanism, i.e., FEDMD-NFDP. Our
solution allows flexible aggregation over heterogeneous lo-
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cal models that can differ e.g., in model structure, size, etc.
Preliminary analysis and thorough empirical results on vari-
ous datasets, settings, and heterogeneous model architectures
demonstrate that our FEDMD-NFDP achieves comparable
utility by using only a few private samples that are randomly
sampled from each party, confirming the effectiveness and
superiority of our framework.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we first going to prove the random sampling
without the replacement and then the replacement.
Theorem 1. [NFDP mechanism: (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy of sampling without replacement] Given a training
dataset of size n, sampling without replacement achieves
(ln n+1n+1−k ,
k
n )-differential privacy, where k is the subsample
size.
Proof. D and D′ are two neighbouring datasets in the data
space D. |D| = n is the size of the dataset. There are two
cases including D = D′ ∪ {u} and D′ = D ∪ {u}, where u
is the the additional sample. LetM be the random sample
mechanism that randomly returns a subset of the data without
replacement here. Let S denotes the all subsets in the joint
domain ofM(D) andM(D′). Then, we use Γ(D), Γ(D′)
denote all subsets ofM(D) andM(D‘) respectively. S ∈ S
is a subset in the domain, where |S| = k denotes the size of
the subset. Then, for a random subset S, we have,
Pr(M(D) = S) =
{
1
(|D|k )
, if S ∈ Γ(D),
0, otherwise.
(1)
Pr(M(D′) = S) =
{
1
(|D
′|
k )
, if S ∈ Γ(D′),
0, otherwise.
(2)
Case 1 (D′ = D ∪ {u}): Due to D ∈ D′, then we have,
Pr(M(D) ∈ Γ(D)) = 1, (3)
Pr(M(D′) ∈ Γ(D)) =
(|D|
k
)(|D′|
k
) . (4)
Let R is a random subset of S and R is composed by two
disjoint subsets, i.e., R = RD ∪RD′\D, where RD ∈ Γ(D)
and RD′\D ∈ Γ(D′) \ Γ(D). Then, we have
Pr(M(D) ∈ R) (5)
=Pr(M(D) ∈ RD) + Pr(M(D) ∈ RD′\D) (6)
=Pr(M(D) ∈ RD) + 0 (7)
=Pr(M(D) ∈ RD) (8)
=Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD) ·
(|D′|
k
)(|D|
k
) (9)
=Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD) ·
(
n+1
k
)(
n
k
) (10)
=Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD) · n+ 1
n+ 1− k (11)
≤Pr(M(D′) ∈ R) · n+ 1
n+ 1− k (12)
(13)
Case 2 (D = D′ ∪ {u}): Due to D′ ∈ D, then we have,
Pr(M(D) ∈ Γ(D′)) =
(|D′|
k
)(|D|
k
) , (14)
Pr(M(D′) ∈ Γ(D′)) = 1. (15)
Let P is a subset of Γ(D) \ Γ(D′), then we have
Pr(M(D) ∈ P ) ≤ Pr(M(D) ∈ Γ(D) \ Γ(D′)), (16)
≤ 1−
(
n−1
k
)(
n
k
) = k
n
. (17)
Let R is a random subset of S and R is composed by two
disjoint subsets, i.e.,R = RD′∪RD\D′ , whereRD′ ∈ Γ(D′)
and RD\D′ ∈ Γ(D) \ Γ(D′). Then, we have
Pr(M(D) ∈ R) (18)
=Pr(M(D) ∈ RD′) + Pr(M(D) ∈ RD\D′) (19)
≤Pr(M(D) ∈ RD′) + k
n
(20)
≤Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD′) ·
(|D′|
k
)(|D|
k
) + k
n
(21)
≤Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD′) ·
(
n−1
k
)(
n
k
) + k
n
(22)
≤Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD′) · n− k
n
+
k
n
(23)
≤Pr(M(D′) ∈ R) · n− k
n
+
k
n
(24)
(25)
Now, we merge the Case 1 and 2 together. Then we
have e = max( n+1n+1−k ,
n−k
n ) =
n+1
n+1−k and δ =
max(0, kn ) =
k
n . Therefore, NFDP without replacement stat-
isfies (ln n+1n+1−k ,
k
n )-differential privacy.
Theorem 2. [NFDP mechanism: (, δ)-differential privacy
of sampling with replacement] Given a training dataset of
size n, sampling with replacement achieves ((k ln n+1n , 1−(
n−1
n
)k
)-differential privacy, where k is the subsample size.
Proof. Here we use the same notation as the last proof. The
proof of replacement is almost similar to the without replace-
ment. First, for a random subset S ∈ S, we have
Pr(M(D) = S) =
{
1
|D|k , if S ∈ Γ(D),
0, otherwise.
(26)
Pr(M(D′) = S) =
{
1
|D′|k , if S ∈ Γ(D′),
0, otherwise.
(27)
Case 1 (D′ = D ∪ {u}): Due to D ∈ D′, then we have,
Pr(M(D) ∈ Γ(D)) = 1, (28)
Pr(M(D′) ∈ Γ(D)) = |D|
k
|D′|k . (29)
Let R is a random subset of S and R is composed by two
disjoint subsets, i.e., R = RD ∪RD′\D, where RD ∈ Γ(D)
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and RD′\D ∈ Γ(D′) \ Γ(D). Then, we have
Pr(M(D) ∈ R) (30)
=Pr(M(D) ∈ RD) + Pr(M(D) ∈ RD′\D) (31)
=Pr(M(D) ∈ RD) + 0 (32)
=Pr(M(D) ∈ RD) (33)
=Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD) · |D
′|k
|D|k (34)
=Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD) · (n+ 1)
k
nk
(35)
≤Pr(M(D′) ∈ R) ·
(
n+ 1
n
)k
(36)
(37)
Case 2 (D = D′ ∪ {u}): Due to D′ ∈ D, then we have,
Pr(M(D) ∈ Γ(D′)) = |D
′|k
|D|k , (38)
Pr(M(D′) ∈ Γ(D′)) = 1. (39)
Let P is a subset of Γ(D) \ Γ(D′), then we have
Pr(M(D) ∈ P ) ≤ Pr(M(D) ∈ Γ(D) \ Γ(D′)), (40)
≤ 1−
(
n− 1
n
)k
. (41)
Let R is a random subset of S and R is composed by two
disjoint subsets, i.e.,R = RD′∪RD\D′ , whereRD′ ∈ Γ(D′)
and RD\D′ ∈ Γ(D) \ Γ(D′). Then, we have
Pr(M(D) ∈ R) (42)
=Pr(M(D) ∈ RD′) + Pr(M(D) ∈ RD\D′) (43)
≤Pr(M(D) ∈ RD′) +
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
(44)
≤Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD′) · |D
′|k
|D|k +
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
(45)
≤Pr(M(D′) ∈ RD′) · (n− 1)
k
nk
+
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
(46)
≤Pr(M(D′) ∈ R) ·
(
n− 1
n
)k
+
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
(47)
(48)
Now, we merge the Case 1 and 2 together. Then we
have e = max(
(
n+1
n
)k
,
(
n−1
n
)k
) =
(
n+1
n
)k
and δ =
max(0, 1− (n−1n )k) = 1− (n−1n )k. Therefore, NFDP with
replacement statisfies (k ln n+1n , 1−
(
n−1
n
)k
)-differential pri-
vacy.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 1 using sampling with replacement
is consistently more private than using sampling without
replacement for any n > 0 and 0 < k ≤ n.
Proof. Sampling with replacement is (k ln n+1n , 1 −(
n−1
n
)k
)-differential privacy and sampling without replace-
ment is (ln n+1n+1−k , k/n)-differential privacy. Let n ≥ 1, and
then if k = 1,
 :k ln
n+ 1
n
= ln
n+ 1
n+ 1− k (49)
and (50)
δ :1−
(
n− 1
n
)k
= k/n (51)
If 1 < k ≤ n,
 :k ln
n+ 1
n
< ln
n+ 1
n+ 1− k (52)
and (53)
δ :1−
(
n− 1
n
)k
< k/n (54)
Therefore, for any fixed n, 0 ≤ k ≤ n, sampling with replace-
ment is more private than Sampling without replacement.
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